No right to early combustion engine phase-out

On March 23, 2026, the Sixth Civil Panel of the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) issued judgments in cases VI ZR 334/23 and VI ZR 365/23, holding that private individuals lack a legal basis to compel automobile manufacturers to phase out internal combustion engine vehicles prior to the timeline established under applicable European Union law. The court affirmed lower court decisions dismissing the claims. The plaintiffs, executive directors of Deutsche Umwelthilfe (Environmental Action Germany), brought actions against major automobile manufacturers, including Bayerische Motoren Werke AG and Mercedes-Benz AG. The defendants were undisputedly in compliance with all applicable statutory climate regulations. However, the plaintiffs argued that, based on the German Federal Constitutional Court’s climate decision, private corporations must adhere to a limited CO₂ “budget” derived from the Paris Agreement. They contended that excessive emissions by the defendants would indirectly infringe their fundamental rights—particularly the intertemporal dimension of the general right of personality under Article 2 of the Basic Law—by necessitating stricter future climate measures that could constrain their freedoms. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief to prohibit the defendants from marketing combustion-engine vehicles after October 31, 2030, and, under certain emissions thresholds, even earlier. The cases were dismissed by lower courts. The case against BMW was dismissed in the Munich Regional Court I on February 7, 2023, a decision affirmed in the Munich Higher Regional Court on October 12, 2023. The case against Mercedes-Benz was dismissed in the Stuttgart Regional Court on September 13, 2022, a decision affirmed in the Stuttgart Higher Regional Court on November 8, 2023. On March 23, 2026, the Federal Court of Justice again affirmed the lower courts' decisions, holding that the plaintiffs are not entitled to injunctive relief. No actionable interference with a protected right was established for below reasons. First, the court found no present or anticipatory violation of the plaintiffs’ general right of personality. The alleged “advance interference” theory failed because no legally binding, actor-specific CO₂ budget exists. While general emission limits can be derived from international and national frameworks, these do not impose individualized obligations on specific private entities or sectors. Second, the court distinguished the case from the Federal Constitutional Court’s prior climate ruling, emphasizing that responsibility for allocating emission reductions lies with the legislature, not private actors. Third, the court rejected tort liability. Any future restrictive climate legislation cannot be legally attributed to the defendants’ conduct. The manufacturers operate within the framework established by EU law—specifically Regulation (EU) 2019/631, as amended—which sets binding emissions targets and timelines, including a full phase-out target for new passenger car emissions by 2035. Compliance with this regulatory regime precludes additional judicially imposed obligations. Finally, the court underscored the constitutional separation of powers. The balancing of climate protection against economic, social, and individual interests—particularly under Article 20a of the Basic Law—is a matter for the legislature, which retains broad discretion. Courts are not authorized to derive specific emission limits or reduction pathways from open-ended constitutional provisions. The ruling confirms that there is no judicially enforceable right to an accelerated phase-out of combustion-engine vehicles beyond the timelines set by EU legislation. Responsibility for determining and implementing climate policy measures remains with the legislative branch.