Request for Unconstitutionality filed by the Honorable Members of the Chamber of Deputies of the Republic of Chile, Daniel Melo Contreras and Others

On July 4, 2025, a group of Chilean deputies, led by Congressman Daniel Melo Contreras, filed a constitutional complaint (requerimiento de inaplicabilidad por inconstitucionalidad) before the Constitutional Court, challenging several provisions of the Draft Framework Law on Sectorial Authorizations (Ley Marco de Autorizaciones Sectoriales – LMAS), commonly referred to as the “Permitting Law.” The complaint was filed under Article 93(1)(3) of the Chilean Constitution and Articles 61 et seq. of Law No. 17.997 (Organic Law of the Constitutional Court). The challenged provisions, Articles 7(a), 9, 10, 76, and 104, aim to simplify over 380 sectoral permits and streamline administrative processes by establishing minimum standards for permit issuance. Although the law claims to maintain environmental safeguards, the plaintiffs argue it effectively weakens environmental and social protections, and that the process of indigenous consultation was omitted, in violation of ILO Convention 169. The plaintiffs argue that the LMAS constitutes a regression in environmental protections, violates constitutional guarantees under Article 19(8) (right to live in a pollution-free environment), and undermines Chile’s commitments under the Escazú Agreement and other international instruments. The Constitutional Court, on July 24, 2025, dismissed the complaint on formal grounds, by a 5–4 majority, citing a lack of specificity in the alleged constitutional violations. However, the dissenting minority (4 judges) strongly criticized the decision, emphasizing that: • The Court had developed prior environmental jurisprudence (STC Rols 13.053 and 14.844) recognizing international standards. • The dissenting opinion argued that, in this context, it was particularly contradictory for the Chilean Constitutional Court, an institution tasked with upholding constitutional supremacy, to refuse to review the merits of a claim alleging a regression in environmental protection standards. The dissenting judges emphasized that the Court’s decision was based on procedural requirements not expressly established in either the Constitution or its Organic Law, and that such a position clearly contradicts Chile’s active role at the international level in promoting access to environmental justice, particularly in light of the Escazú Agreement and Advisory Opinion OC-32/25, which affirms the pro actione principle. This principle holds that procedural rules must not be interpreted or applied in a manner that unjustifiably hinders access to the courts, especially in environmental matters. Citing paragraph 543 of OC-32/25, the dissent invoked the pro actione principle, which requires courts to adopt the interpretation most favorable to access to justice in environmental matters.