District of Columbia v. Exxon Mobil Corp.

The District of Columbia Superior Court denied fossil fuel companies’ motions for reconsideration of the court’s April 21, 2025 orders denying their motions to dismiss the District of Columbia’s lawsuit alleging that they violated D.C.’s Consumer Protection Procedures Act (CPPA) by misleading consumers regarding the role of their products in causing climate change. First, the court rejected the arguments of the Shell, Exxon, and Chevron defendants that allegedly misleading statements they made about their products’ environmental benefits were indistinguishable from statements made by the BP defendants that the court found to be inactionable under the CPPA. Second, the court denied reconsideration to the Chevron defendants as to their argument that statements about a fuel additive that they stopped selling in the District more than 15 years earlier were immaterial as a matter of law. Third, the court rejected the BP defendants’ contention that the court erroneously concluded that natural gas was a good BP sold to D.C. consumers; the court said that even if it had conflated the direct sale of gasoline to D.C. consumers with sale of natural gas in D.C., the District of Columbia had sufficiently alleged “that BP paints itself as an environmental steward in order to sell goods” to those consumers. The court said its finding that the CPPA’s “goods and services” requirement was satisfied was not dependent on D.C. consumers’ purchase of natural gas.

The court denied the companies’ joint motion to certify the denials of the motions to dismiss for interlocutory appeal. The companies asked the court to certify three questions for appeal: (1) whether they could be held liable for the speech of trade associations under the CPPA and the First Amendment; (2) whether the First Amendment protected statements made as part of an alleged “campaign of denial”; and (3) whether they could be held liable under the CPPA for speech that does not concern consumer goods or services. The court said these questions did not present controlling questions of law but instead presented fact-intensive questions. The court also said that the defendants consistently misrepresented the court’s findings regarding the motions to dismiss because it had not reached legal conclusions but had merely found that the District’s allegations were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. The court also found that judicial economy was not a sufficient justification for interlocutory appeal.

The District of Columbia Superior Court allowed the District of Columbia to proceed with claims against fossil fuel companies under D.C.’s Consumer Protection Procedures Act (CPPA). The court issued four separate orders, one for each set of affiliated companies, with each order addressing the particular arguments made by a set of defendants. In its order on BP p.l.c. and BP American Inc.’s (BP defendants’) motion to dismiss, the court concluded that the District plausibly alleged that the defendant companies could be held liable for “climate-denialism” statements made by trade associations. Although the court found that the District stated greenwashing claims against the BP defendants, it said it would “not now decide whether the individual statements sufficiently relate to goods or services such that the CPPA applies.” The court disagreed with the BP defendants’ argument that because there was “common knowledge” of climate change’s risks, the alleged greenwashing statements could not mislead a reasonable consumer. The court did find, however, that the District did not state a facially plausible misrepresentation claim regarding the Invigorate fuel additive, though it rejected the BP defendants’ argument that the complaint did not sufficiently allege that its statements about natural gas were misleading. The court also found that the BP defendants’ omissions were actionable under the CPPA and found that the claims were not “in and of themselves First Amendment violations worthy of dismissal.” Because the court agreed with the District that it was not seeking relief for the physical effects of climate change, the court declined to consider the BP defendants’ arguments that D.C. law was preempted by the Clean Air Act or otherwise could not constitutionally apply.

In its order on Chevron Corporation and Chevron U.S.A.’s motion to dismiss, the court found that the District plausibly alleged that the defendants were liable for allegedly misleading statements made by third-party trade associations. The court also rejected the argument that the District’s claims necessarily violated the defendants’ First Amendment rights. In addition, the court found that the District plausibly alleged greenwashing claims under the CPPA, finding that the allegedly misleading statements were sufficiently connected to goods and services, that the District plausibly alleged that the statements were not “non-actionable opinions or puffery,” and that the allegedly misleading statements need not actually be false. The court declined to make a determination on the materiality of the statements. The court also found that the District’s allegations regarding the gasoline additive Techron were sufficient to state a CPPA violation.

In its order on Exxon Mobil Corporation and ExxonMobil Oil Corporation’s (Exxon defendants’) motion to dismiss, the court first concluded it had personal jurisdiction over the defendants. The court rejected the Exxon defendants’ contention that it should consider each allegedly misleading statement separately. Because the District alleged “a singular decades-long story of deceit,” the court said it would “take a mosaic approach and consider the alleged misrepresentations in the aggregate, rather than separately.” The court found that the District plausibly stated a claim for relief under the CPPA and rejected the arguments that the First Amendment or the dormant Commerce Clause barred the District’s claims.

In its order on Shell plc and Shell USA, Inc.’s (Shell defendants’) motion to dismiss, the court found that the District plausibly alleged, for purposes of the motion to dismiss, that the court’s statements were sufficiently related to goods and services to state a claim under the CPPA. The court also found that the District plausibly alleged that the Shell defendants made a false or misleading statement and that the District plausible alleged materiality. The court also found that the First Amendment did not provide a basis for dismissal at this stage. Because the District did not seek relief “for the physical impacts of climate change,” the court declined to address the Shell defendants’ argument that such claims would be preempted.

In the District of Columbia’s lawsuit alleging that fossil fuel companies violated D.C.’s Consumer Protection Procedures Act by misleading consumers about their products’ role in causing climate change, the court held that an amendment exempting claims brought by the District from the District of Columbia Anti-SLAPP (Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation) Act was constitutional. The D.C. Attorney General proposed the amendment in 2021 to “clarify that government enforcement suits are not subject to” the Anti-SLAPP Act and referenced this action. The amendment was enacted through temporary and emergency laws beginning in November 2021 and was permanently codified in 2023. The court rejected the fossil fuel companies’ arguments that the exemption violated the First Amendment, was impermissibly retrospective, and was an impermissible bill of attainder that targeted the defendants by specifically attempting to insulate this lawsuit. Because the exemption was constitutional, the court denied as moot the companies’ special motions to dismiss pursuant to the Anti-SLAPP Act.

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