Levin Richmond Terminal Corp. v. City of Richmond

The federal district court for the Northern District of California largely denied the City of Richmond and the Richmond City Council’s motions to dismiss challenges to an ordinance prohibiting the storage and handling of coal and petcoke. The plaintiffs are the operator of a port and marine terminal that is the only coal and petcoke bulk handling facility and marine shipment transfer point in the Bay Area; the operator of a nearby refinery that produces petcoke and uses the terminal to ship the product abroad; and a Utah company that mines and sources thermal coal. The plaintiffs all alleged that the City viewed reducing climate change as the ordinance’s objective. The court found that the plaintiffs stated plausible claims under the dormant Commerce Clause (based on a Pike balancing test but not on a theory of extraterritoriality) and foreign Commerce Clause, as well as under the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Takings Clauses. In addition, the court allowed the plaintiffs to proceed with claims that the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act and the Shipping Act of 1984 preempted the ordinance, but not with a claim of preemption by the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act. The court also granted leave for permissive intervention to Sierra Club and San Francisco Baykeeper.

The owner and operator of a marine terminal in the City of Richmond filed a lawsuit challenging a City ordinance that prohibited transloading and export of coal and petroleum coke. The plaintiffs alleged that the City and its mayor viewed the objective of the ordinance as to reduce global climate change. The complaint asserted causes of action under the Commerce Clause, the Takings Clause, the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, the Impairments Clause, the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act, the Shipping Act of 1984, and the California Constitution.