Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. BP p.l.c.

–

–

–

–

On October 2, 2019, the district court granted the defendants’ motion to temporarily extend its stay of the remand order until the U.S. Supreme Court resolved the application for a stay. (The district court previously extended the stay of the remand order pending the Fourth Circuit’s resolution of the companies’ stay motion.) The district court said Baltimore could seek to rescind the temporary extension “as improvidently granted” by filing a motion by October 7.

–

On July 31, 2019, the federal district court for the District of Maryland denied oil and gas companies’ motion for a stay of the June 10 remand order returning the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore’s (Baltimore’s) climate change lawsuit to state court. The companies had sought to stay the remand order until the Fourth Circuit resolves their appeal. Instead, a stay agreed to by Baltimore will remain in place pending the resolution of the companies’ anticipated motion for a stay in the Fourth Circuit. Although the district court agreed with the companies that removal of the case based on application of federal law raised “complex and unsettled” legal questions, the court concluded that appellate jurisdiction in this case would likely extend only to the issue of whether the case was properly removed under the federal officer removal statute, an issue on which the court concluded the companies had not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success. The court further found that the companies had not demonstrated irreparable harm since the appeal would only be rendered moot in the event a state court entered final judgment before the appeal was resolved. The court also was not persuaded that the cost of litigating in state court would cause irreparable injury and disagreed with the companies’ contention that federal courts were “uniquely qualified” to address the issues presented in the case. Regarding the harm to the opposing party and weighing the public interest, the district court found that the impacts of further delay of litigation on the merits of Baltimore’s claims weighed against a stay. The court also noted that even if the remand order were vacated, interim proceedings in state court “may well advance” the case’s resolution in federal court.

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

The federal district court for the District of Maryland remanded the City of Baltimore’s climate change lawsuit against oil and gas companies to state court. The court concluded that federal question jurisdiction did not exist and also rejected alternative bases for federal jurisdiction. First, the court rejected the defendants’ argument that federal common law governed Baltimore’s state law nuisance claim as a “cleverly veiled preemption argument.” The court said ordinary preemption was merely a defense and did not permit it to treat the claim as if it had been pleaded under federal law for jurisdictional purposes. The court further concluded that federal common law would not support removal even under the complete preemption doctrine because the defendants had not shown that any federal common law claim for public nuisance was available and case law suggested that the Clean Air Act displaced any such claim. Second, the court found that the case did not fall within the “slim category” of cases in which federal question jurisdiction exists for state law claims that raise substantial and disputed federal issues. Although the court acknowledged that there were “federal interests in addressing climate change,” the court said the defendants had not established that “a federal issue” such as foreign policy or a federal regulatory scheme was a necessary element of Baltimore’s claims. Third, the court rejected the argument that the foreign affairs doctrine or the Clean Air Act completely preempted Baltimore’s claims. Fourth, the court found no basis for federal jurisdiction based on defendants’ activities on federal enclaves. Regarding the alternative bases for removal jurisdiction, the court found that the defendants did not demonstrate that jurisdiction existed under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, or that the claims were removable under the federal officer removal statute, the bankruptcy removal statute, or admiralty jurisdiction. Pursuant to a stipulation by the parties, the remand order is temporarily stayed. The defendants are seeking to stay the order pending their appeal to the Fourth Circuit.

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

On October 11, 2018, fossil fuel companies filed papers in Maryland federal court opposing remand of the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore’s (Baltimore’s) lawsuit seeking to hold the companies liable for the impacts of climate change. The companies argued that the claims necessarily arose under federal common law, and that even if only state-law claims were asserted, the claims necessarily raised disputed and substantial federal issues. In addition, the companies argued that the Clean Air Act and other federal statutes completely preempted the claims and that federal jurisdiction was also available pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, the federal officer removal statue, federal enclave doctrine, the bankruptcy removal statute, and admiralty jurisdiction.

On September 11, 2018, Baltimore moved to remand its climate change lawsuit against fossil fuel companies to Maryland state court. First, Baltimore contended that the defendants’ assertions that federal common law governed the City’s tort claims raised an ordinary preemption defense, which did not confer subject matter jurisdiction. Moreover, Baltimore argued, its claims were not required to be pleaded under federal common law and, in any event, fell outside the scope of federal common law. Baltimore further argued that the defendants’ other grounds for removal did not supply a basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction. In particular, Baltimore asserted that the complaint did not necessarily raise substantial, disputed federal questions; that the Clean Air Act did not preempt the City’s claims; that the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act did not supply jurisdiction for the claims; that there was no federal enclave jurisdiction; that the federal officer removal statute did not apply because the defendants did not act under federal officers; that the bankruptcy removal provisions did not apply; and that admiralty jurisdiction did not provide a basis for removal.